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in Contemporary Niger
Abdoulaye Sounaye
 
Introduction
1 A  colleague  of  mine  who  was  conducting  research  on  Islamic  associations  and
development  in  Niger  could  hardly  hide  her  disappointment  after  several  weeks  of
fieldwork: “[W]ith these organizations, not much is happening in terms of development,
despite their claims” (Dnyanada 2010).1On another occasion, one of my informants, an
Islamic faith-based executive who had spent long years in development work in West
Africa opened up to me about his  experience in Niger:  “It  pains me to see so many
development initiatives, but very little happening on the ground” (Ben Ali 2010).
2 These anxieties may well be flirting with the pessimism characteristic of the perception
of development efforts in Africa, but they tell a story of a connection between Islam and
development  in  Niger  that  has  often  been,  if  not  overlooked,  at  least  understudied.
Despite this merit, these pronouncements fail to put the “work” of Islamic organizations
in Niger into historical perspective. Not only that, they fail to see the new dynamics in the
interaction between Islam and development actions. How is this interaction affecting the
ways of doing development? What kind of actors and discourses are emerging within this
context? And, how do actors understand both Islam and development as they strive to
put to work Islamic and international development principles? 
3 What is important in the quotes above is, thus, not so much that they are corroborated
but  that  they  reveal  expectations  from  both  of  my  interlocutors  about  Islam  and
development work in Niger. Twenty years ago, the concept of development hardly meant
anything to the handful of Islamic associations in the country. Now, among the 55 legally
authorized Nigerien Islamic associations, more than ten claim to undertake development
actions in a way or another. A fifth may just be a number but in this case it is indicative of
a  discourse in which Islam and development have become major  social  and political
signifiers.  In  effect,  this  discourse  is  now  shaping  not  only  the  actions  of  ordinary
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Nigerien Muslims but also development initiatives from domestic as well as transnational
organizations.  Mediating  development  through  an  Islamic  framework  has  become  a
marker of both Islamic discourse and development action.
4 A quick look at the history of development interventions in Niger will  show growing
Islamic motivation with global Islamic NGOs, such as Islamic Relief, Qatar Aid and Al Basar
International Foundation, but also among domestic associations and Muslim elites who
are seeking to capitalize on their position and lead the way to social change. Particularly
with  these  elites,  looking  at  development  through  the  lens  of  Islamic  tradition  has
become a major preoccupation and even a practice through which they legitimize their
presence in the public sphere. How this motivation is expressed, presented and actualized
in the current  context  is  of  interest  to students  of  Islam and development in Niger.
Analyzing  this  trend  will  help  to  highlight  an  Islamic  perspective  on  development
initiatives  in  Niger  and  to  understand  how  preoccupations  about  development  are
conceptualized and dealt with in contexts that cast themselves primarily as religious.
5 Scholars (Kaag 2008,  2009;  Otayek & Soares 2009;  Sadouni  2009a;  Renders 2002)  have
shown that the marriage of Islam and development is not a new phenomenon in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Even in Niger, major transnational initiatives in the name of Islam were
already being undertaken in the late 1970s.  I  will  argue that  the current connection
between Islam and development has led to two phenomena. First,  it  has urged NGOs
operating in the country if not to rethink their development philosophies then at least to
assert them explicitly. Second, the structural transformation of the Islamic sphere and
the predominance of development discourse have resulted in the emergence of a new
category of Muslim social activists who are adopting development roles as brokers and
inventive mediators.
6 I do not intend to discuss the reason for the rise of Islamic NGOs in Niger. However, since
this explains part of the process I am describing, a brief summary is called for, identifying
three factors at play in the relatively rapid development of Islamic NGOs. First of all, the
political context of liberalism that recognized the freedom of association has created the
structural conditions for the marriage of Islamic and development discourses. The second
factor is the economic context of neoliberalism, which has lead, in countries like Niger, to
the state disengaging from major social sectors such as healthcare and has set the stage
for various initiatives, especially those focusing on education, healthcare and welfare.
Finally, the ideological context in which Islam is appropriated for identity politics (Holder
2009; Souley 2009; Clarke 2006; Casanova 1994) is worth mentioning because it has led to
the emergence of a Muslim elite claiming a development role. Islamic NGOs have become
the main avenue where elite entrepreneurs go beyond speculative arguments to put to
work their vision of how development work ought to be carried out.
7 In  general,  as  Otayek  & Soares  (2009)  have  pointed  out,  African  Muslim elites  have
engaged humanitarianism with religious motivation. In Niger, local initiatives emerged
after  1990 in  an attempt  to  alleviate  the  effects  of  the  economic  and social  policies
dictated by neoliberalism. We have usually understood neoliberalism through its
economic philosophies, relegating to the margins the human rights discourse that sets its
foundations in recent democratization processes in Africa. Against these foundations, a
trend  of  re-Islamization  serves  as  a  channel  for  organizations,  both  domestic  and
international, to undertake social projects and reach out to a wider audience. Multiform
and  pluralistic,  this  perspective  has  enriched  the  problematic  of  development  by
emphasizing the faith factor; it has also theoretically complicated the picture of Islam and
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its  appropriations  in  the  public  sphere.  Along  with  local  organizations,  many
international  Islamic  agencies  have  initiated  charity  and  assistance  programs.  Most
recently, the Qatar Charity has signed an agreement with the state to fund an educational
project  designed  to  support  undertrained  young  Nigeriens.  Similar  initiatives  have
populated the domain of Islamic development in Niger since the emergence of an Islamic
sphere seeking to do things in an Islamic way.
8 Still, the involvement of Muslim agents in development initiatives has remained mostly
unnoticed  and  unstudied  despite  the  increasing  number  of  Islamic  faith-based
organizations that have become major players in many development sectors. One of the
objectives of this article is to remedy this knowledge gap by providing a discussion on
Islamic faith-based initiatives and Muslim actors as they enter the development arena.
9 To achieve this, I propose looking at the socio-political, but also the theoretical, context
of the case I present. Then I give an account of the interventions by the Africa Muslims
Agency  in  Niger,  as  an  example  of  how  a  transnational  Islamic  faith-based  agency
perceives  and  undertakes  development  in  Niger.  Over  the  years,  its  philosophy  has
significantly changed along with the geography of its interventions. To illustrate the role
some Muslim leaders are playing in development, the third section introduces Idrisa, a
graduate of the Islamic University of Niger whose “contribution”, as he puts it, is to help
set the “communication bridge” between Muslims and international agencies promoting
“pro-development  behavior”  (fertility  management,  water  sanitation,  immunization).
Finally,  in  an  attempt  to  link  the  cases  I  have  discussed,  I  present  some  of  the
perspectives of  my informants on doing development and look at  how they redefine
development and practice it  within an Islamic framework.  I  argue that beyond these
individual  cases  lies a  shared preoccupation among Islamic  faith-based organizations
about development actions conforming to Islamic principles.
10 Two sets of data have been collected for the research that resulted in this article. The first
was collected in Maradi in the summer of 20082. The second set of data was collected from
December 2009 to March 2010 in the Niamey area. In the process, I had a series of field
trips,  interviews  and  informal  conversations  with  executives,  employees  and  project
beneficiaries as  well  as  mediators  of  development  initiatives.  Using  participant
observation,  I  sought treatment at  the Africa Muslims Agency (AMA) Eye Hospital  in
Niamey as a way to assess the significance of AMA’s contribution to Niger’s healthcare
system.  It  was  also an opportunity  for  me to see  how AMA’s  discourse on changing
development  policies  has  materialized  on  the  ground.  I  observed  activities  on  sites,
attended sermons and ulama3 training sessions designed to raise awareness and facilitate
the success of sensitization campaigns in Niamey.4
 
Context and Background
11 A juxtaposition of Niger’s statistics and core development indicators could go as follows:
65% of  its  15  million people  live  below the poverty line;  80% of  this  population are
chronically affected by food insecurity and 12.3% by acute malnutrition; 42% lack access
to clean water; 90% of the population live on 12% of the arable land; women’s fertility
rates are 7.19 births/woman, which is the highest in the world; and on the UNDP Human
Development Index, the country scores 0.340, which is the lowest in the world.5 
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12 These figures mean that Niger is included among the poorest countries in the world. It is
described as a place where harsh natural living conditions have combined with a lack of
opportunities and low incomes to make it one of the most politically unstable, socially
vulnerable and economically challenging. As such, it epitomizes the very context where
every  sector  is  a  priority  for  development  policies.  The  moral  dimension  of  these
conditions  is  regularly  put  forward  in  global  efforts  to  alleviate  poverty,  improve
women’s conditions and fight deprivation and social inequalities. As in most Sub-Saharan
countries, this picture of Niger ushers in international development assistance through
NGOs.
13 Subsequently, Niger has seen a plethora of local and transnational NGOs in recent years,
which have mainly focused on socioeconomic sectors such as food security, education and
healthcare,  but  also on income-generating activities.  Most  of  these organizations are
secular but a handful are faith-based, with their initiatives shaped by the precepts of
their religion. In a country where Muslims account for 95% of the population, it is not
surprising  that  Islam  has  inspired  many  local  and  international  initiatives.  In  fact,
claiming Islam for development actions is not new in Niger. In the 1980s, several Islamic
NGOs were operating outside the government-to-government pattern that  dominated
international aid, especially aid from Middle East countries.
14 In addition to the organization I introduce below, Africa Muslims Agency, which launched
its  first  project  in Niger in 1985,  one could also mention the Saudi-sponsored World
Muslim  League  (Ligue  Mondiale  Islamique  au  Niger)  that has  been  running  a “second
chance”  school  and  a  health  clinic  for  the  past  three  decades.  Hundreds  of  young
secondary-school students have enrolled in the school to take their exams for a second or
third  time  in  an  attempt  to  gain  access  to  university.  Underprivileged  children  are
generally given priority as  a  way of  combating social  inequalities.  Initially,  the most
active section of the NGO was its health services and the school, which was located in the
same compound on the Haro Banda area of Niamey. In the beginning the school was
hardly  regarded  as  serious  and  competitive.  Over  the  years  however,  it  has  slowly
established  itself  as  one  of  the  most  successful  schools,  based  on  its  national
baccalaureate exam results.
15 In the last  decade and following a global  trend,  the number of  Islamic organizations
claiming development roles has significantly increased. The most recent Islamic NGOs
include the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), Qatar Aid, Jamaat Ahmmadiya, Al
Basar  International  Foundation,  Muslim  Hands  and  Islamic  Relief.  Healthcare,  food
security, education and access to water constitute their primary sectors of intervention.
Often, their projects may also include the construction of madrasas and mosques and the
equipping  of  centers  with  computers.  While  these  organizations  have  signed  formal
conventions with the government,  they have consistently  sought  direct  contact  with
their  beneficiaries,  implementing  a  major  principle  of contemporary  development
framework: having as little as possible to do with state bureaucracy. This attitude rests on
the conclusion that state-led development has failed, a standpoint that is consistent with
the current assessment of neoliberal development efforts in Niger and the global south
(Bush, 2007).
16 Until  organized Islam voiced its concern about major state social initiatives (Sounaye
2005), state institutions framed most development discourses and policies. In many ways,
as is the case in most countries in the developing world (Rapley 1996), doing development
remained the preserve of the state, in particular because of the assumption that the state
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is the primary mediator of development. The statism that framed development policies in
Niger played a significant role in the way development initiatives have been shaping up
since the 1990s. Prior to the period when international donors intervened, they did so
mainly through state institutions. Until the mid-1980s, state institutions determined the
priorities, designed the intervention plans and provided the personnel. This centrality of
state  institutions  –  in  the  conception  and  the  execution  of  development  –  limited
individual and private initiatives. In controlling the public sphere and limiting non-state
sponsored actors,  the military regimes (Kountche:  1974-1987;  Saibou:  1987-1991)  that
ruled the country prior to democratization in the 1990s made it impossible for private
actors in Niger to emerge in the Islamic sphere.6 
17 When the liberal view of civil society became the norm in the Nigerien public sphere,
fragmentation of authority ensued, with local actors claiming increasing eligibility for the
zakat.7 Among  the  new Islamic  associations,  many  accessed  shares  of  the  Saudi  and
Kuwaiti Zakat funds for their own projects. In this instance, madrasas and mosque projects
proved successful in gaining the financial support of Middle Eastern monarchies.  The
translation of liberalism at the local level consisted of breaking with state tutelage and
sponsorship, and seeking development funds outside the realm of the state. At the same
time, political liberalization and the fragmentation of the religious sphere led the state
and international agencies to open up to religion-based opinions as these have shown
their  potential  for  political  mobilization.  In  the  1990s,  as  Clarke  (2006)  argued,
international development took a “faith matters” turn that affected its discourses and
policies.  In  Niger  one  could  easily  argue  that  for  three  categories,  Islam  has  never
mattered  as  much as  in  the  current  context:  (1)  for  international  agencies,  such  as
UNICEF, that needed new strategies to pass on messages in a domain like immunization;
(2)  Islamic faith-based organizations,  such as  the Africa Muslims Agency (AMA),  that
operate in conformity with Islamic ethics are important; and (3) the Muslim
“development entrepreneurs” (Otayek & Soares 2009) like Idrisa, the leader of an Islamic
organization that I introduce below who has reinvented himself as a mediator between
the so-called developers and the beneficiaries of their projects.
18 In general, even though Islamic faith-based organizations are still secondary actors when
it comes to development initiatives, it should be noted that they have been instrumental
in shaping the state’s position on major international conventions on several occasions
(Alidou 2008;  Idrissa 2005;  Moulaye 2006;  Sounaye 2005).  Among these organizations,
criticism  and  rejection  have  not  been  the  only  attitudes  towards  state-sponsored
initiatives. Participation has been another pattern of organized Islam’s presence in the
public sphere as Islamic organizations and individual Muslim leaders have given support
to  the  state  and  international  agencies.  Whether  with  family  planning  or  HIV/AIDS
projects, ulama have contributed, if not to run the initiatives, at least to raise awareness
with respect to disease prevention among communities across the country.
 
Changing Development Practices in Niger? The Case
of the Africa Muslims Agency 
19 AMA launched its operations in Niger in 1985, the same year it started in many countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Niger was one of  the countries hardest hit  by a succession of
draughts and famines that left most people in the countryside in chronic need of food
assistance.  AMA thus  sought  to  help alleviate  the hardship of  living conditions  with
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interventions in healthcare, food assistance, water and education. A humanitarian call
prompted  AMA’s  first  projects  in  Niger.  In  the  areas  where  they  were  initiated,
orphanages and dispensaries were set up to benefit the communities. Ben Ali, one of my
informants  proudly  observed:  “AMA is  the  first  Islamic  agency to  start  development
projects  in  Africa.”8 The  Kuwaiti  Emir’s  financial  support  helped  start  AMA’s  first
interventions in the country.
20 The agency’s projects in Niger are geared towards community benefit. “We never fund
projects for individuals; our focus is the community and its benefits.”9 AMA has a vision
of collective ownership of its projects, a philosophy that seeks to ensure a lasting impact.
The emphasis on the community and collective welfare in AMA’s perspective is nothing
but a way of following the recommendation of Islam. Ben Ali, an AMA program manager,
attempted a comparison: “It is like building a mosque or an orphanage; you never build
them for one single individual or family.”10 As a result, AMA funds various micro-projects,
orphanages, schools and medical centers across Niger that are expected to have a direct
and immediate impact on communal life. So far, the most peculiar project it has funded is
a domestic waste-collection project that a group of unemployed young people started in
Niamey.  Ben Ali  takes this  project  as  an example of  AMA’s  ouverture (availability)  to
receive,  examine  and  eventually  fund  any  project  with  the  potential  to  improve
communal life. Limiting funding to group projects is not only expected to increase the
standard of living of the community, it also encourages better managerial practices and
has broader impact. Ben Ali’s criticism of development action at the beginning of this
article resonates here. He justifies this philosophy of intervention: “many of our projects
failed because some have been diverted from their initial goals or ownership”. In fact,
infrastructures built on private land have led to major disputes that have disrupted the
life of the community and reduced the real impact of the investment. Several are still
unresolved  and  pending  court  cases,  with  parties  claiming  either  ownership  or
compensation, especially when the projects are a madrasa or a health centre built on a
private land. In these cases,  the projects have “created problems among people”,  my
interlocutor concludes.
21 Obviously, the complexity of land tenure has affected AMA’s policies. In a move to seek
more efficiency and minimize the impact of local politics, “now, whenever we build a
school or a health centre, we make sure AMA owns the land”. For the same reasons and to
increase ownership, AMA also avoids doing the project itself, except in a few cases: “We
were building infrastructures fifteen years ago, but about five or six years ago, we ended
that. Now, when we build an infrastructure, we manage it” (Ben Ali 2010). An illustration
of this change lies across the street from the AMA Niger headquarters in Wadata, Niamey,
where  the  NGO  has built  an  eye  hospital  (Hôpital  Ophtalmologique  Makka)  that  treats
patients from across Niger.
22 AMA’s policy change is also illustrated by the diversification of its activities and the scope
of its interventions. It still funds orphanages, schools and dispensaries, but has also added
women’s training centres, a youth vocational training centre (Centre Ousseimi, Basora)
and has gradually encouraged income-generating activities (dressmaking,  embroidery,
etc.). The map of AMA interventions now includes areas beyond Niamey, where most of
its  projects  used to  be  based.  In  1997,  AMA used to  have three dispensaries  and an
orphanage in Niamey, but now has several regional centres in the central-southern town
of Maradi, Tahoua in the north and Tillaberi in the western part of the country. As a way
of putting in practice its policy of helping the underprivileged, AMA has systematically
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built  orphanages,  mostly  for  fatherless  daughters,  as  “a  form  of  social  service  that
directly benefits Nigerien families”, according to Ben Ali.
23 Over the years, AMA’s intervention principles have significantly changed, adjusting to
both the socio-political  context  and the international  development environment.  Not
willing to deal with the state’s institutions and intermediaries, Ben Ali observes, “we want
to be in direct contact with people; that’s why our name has changed. We are now AMA-
Direct Aid”. The pledge to be more efficient and in a close contact with communities has
transformed  the  agency,  according  to  Ben  Ali.  Following  a  global  discourse  on
development and strategies to achieve it, especially in the African context, AMA Niger
envisages devoting most of its funds to initiatives on the ground. To this end, the agency
has restructured its budget to cut administrative costs and allocate most of its resources
to actual projects. 
24 This is  not the only issue AMA has to deal  with,  however.  In effect,  fundraising and
provisions for Niger may have been plunging as AMA International  has expanded its
activities and the scope of its interventions. The perceptions of the agency have been
affecting both external funding and the receptivity of its initiatives at the local level. A
few years ago, as its employees confirmed, AMA was primarily viewed as the “alms-giving
hand” of the oil rich Middle Eastern monarchies, mainly Kuwait. As such, most people
thought  it  was  only  interested  in  performing  a  religious  act,  i.e.,  giving  alms  and
distributing Zakat to the needy. Today, AMA’s policies want to appear more development
oriented as it subjects its initiatives and operations to strict managerial criteria.  This
professionalism, as Ben Ali calls it,  is expected to help the agency achieve its goal of
building  self-sufficiency  and  community-based  development.  A  statement  he  made
during our conversation captures this: “We don’t have petrodollars despite what people
may think; we are not giving petrodollars. We are more professional and looking for ways
to be more useful”.11 But being useful requires interventions that are not determined a
priori: “We take into consideration the context and the needs people express. We request
projects  and then after  evaluating their  feasibility,  we fund them.  The ideas  for  our
projects come from the groups.”12
25 As far as AMA’s projects are concerned, the most popular are the Community Grain Banks
(CGB).  Their  popularity  in  the  Nigerien  context  comes  from their  immediate  impact
whenever harvests are insufficient and food shortages affect the country. NGOs such as
Islamic Relief,  Plan International and CARE have adopted this strategy to make grain
available,  but  also  to  fight  price  inflation,  in  particular  during  the  lean  season.  A
community-owned  initiative,  the  CGB  is  managed  by  a  board  appointed  by  the
community. Individuals receive loans they are expected to repay over a pre-determined
period of time. In most cases, because of the low level of cash flow, the loans are repaid in
kind. Depending on the case, the bank receives the initial capital from the donor NGO or
its partners. Chronic food shortages prompted reliance on these as a mechanism to help
alleviate or prevent famine. The 2005 food crisis in Niger, which received global publicity
(Crombé & Jézéquel 2009), reinforced the idea that such an approach works, but also that
a community-based assistance program is the most efficient way of dealing with food
shortages. For example, the transnational Islamic Relief, whose expansion into Niger was
prompted by the same 2005 food shortages, relies heavily on this mechanism and on free
food distribution across the western region of the country.
26 AMA has espoused this method as a way of assisting communities that depend on grains
but also as an illustration of its direct aid philosophy. Generally, when a community has
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agreed on the idea of a CGB, they submit a proposal to AMA. When granted, “our support
is only for one year. We may assist the bank for an additional year, but never more than
two years. The third year, the organization is on its own.”13 This policy is intended to
promote  autonomy  and  accountability,  which  are  two  principles  AMA  has  strictly
followed for the last six years. If a group manages its CGB well in the first two years with
the means AMA provides,  the group then comes to own it  and is  responsible for its
sustainability. This has been working well, according to Ben Ali, and “all 28 CGBs that
started last year have been granted a second year of support.”14
27 In general, according to my AMA interlocutors, “most loans are paid on time.”15 This is a
way for them to measure the success of their CGB projects. For Habu, “this is how things
should be among Muslims”. For Ben Ali and Isa, the management skills and the main
values  that  frame  their  view of  development  work  made  this  achievement  possible.
Obviously, in many instances these values are not exclusive to AMA but are a set of core
values on which international development is based.
28 In concluding this section, I observe that the idea that assistance should go directly to the
needy has been reinforced by the neoliberal ideal of state non-interventionism. Doing
without the state and prioritizing communities’ direct access to assistance is now part of
AMA’s intervention principles, at least according to their funding guidelines. However,
whether this has been fully implemented is a matter of debate, especially because of the
culture of development brokerage that has been shaping NGO interventions in Niger. In
any case,  attentive  analysis  shows  that  AMA,  like  many Islamic  development  actors,
operates in two different registers:  on the one hand it  claims to follow international
standards, while on the other, it portrays itself as an NGO whose principles are grounded
in the Muslim values of social welfare and justice. 
 
Mediating Development: The Bridge between
International Agencies and Ordinary Muslims16
29 A significant  number of  the 55 local  Nigerien Islamic organizations17 are involved in
development work in the form of social welfare and raising awareness regarding state
social policies and international conventions.18 Fauziya19is one of the organizations that
has  found  an  opportunity  to  draw  on  the  Islamic  tradition  “to  serve  development
purposes” in the current context. Fauziya belongs to the second generation of Islamic
organizations that were created after the political reform in the 1990s that restructured
the Islamic sphere. While the first group emerged under the leadership of ulama and
reputed  Muslim  leaders,  most  of  the  second  generation  were  created  and  ruled  by
graduates of  Islamic learning institutions claiming public roles in Niger.  Both groups
therefore  belong  to  the  post-single  party  rule,  with  Fauziya  and  similar  institutions
emerging  approximately  a  decade  later.  As  leadership  disputes  add  to  theological
divergences, the younger generation is distancing itself from the initial organizations,
most of which were under the patronage of renown ulama. The younger generation has
regularly criticized the ulama for either complacency vis-à-vis the state or lack of sound
knowledge  (Niandou  1993;  Sounaye  2009).  For  many  of  these  young  organizations,
breaking ties with a “traditional Islam” too prone to maintaining the status quo and
escaping the influence of their ulama representatives became a major goal.
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30 Fauziya epitomizes this trend of rejuvenation of organized Islam that has severed ties
with the ulama and is seeking to restructure the Islamic sphere. Idrisa, a leader of this
organization, exemplifies this new Islamic leadership. He is one of the trainers and has
been involved in many workshops over the last few years. During the week of my first
conversation with him,  he was preparing several  upcoming training sessions,  two of
which had been ordered by the UNICEF office in Niamey and another by the Programme
Élargi  de  Vaccination,  the  branch  of  Niger’s  Ministry  of  Health  that  is  in  charge  of
immunizations. All three courses were related to social policies and were designed for
ulama with  prominent  roles  in  their  respective  communities.  “We  use  the  Islamic
tradition  to  explain  to  people  what  the  policies  and [development]  programmes  are
about,” Idrisa said.20
31 The need for these types of mediators became particularly evident when family-planning
programs  met  with  the  opposition  and  eventually  the rejection  of  the  ulama at  the
beginning of the 1990s. Idrisa was aware of this and recognized that many ideas and
initiatives would have had different outcomes if they had been sufficiently mediated. In
fact, several heated controversies in the country have made it necessary for development
interventions to walk a fine line, especially in domains such as reproductive health and
immunization, which have proved to be sensitive topics for Muslims in Niger. Idrisa can
thus justify the reason for focusing on communication strategies. Drawing lessons from
the rejection of the 1994 Family Code project, Fauziya has made communication its main
domain  of  intervention.  Idrisa,  for  example,  is  working  to  build  a  “communication
bridge” (le  pont  de  la  communication)  between international  agencies like UNICEF,  and
ordinary Muslims who generally lack access to the Islamic scriptures because of linguistic
barriers. Mediators like Idrisa are key players because a project often succeeds
or fails based on their work. “They sensitize both the developer and the
developee, and they are the fulcrum of communication. They navigate
that confusing space between developer’s and developee’s contexts, often
being  asked  to  clarify  misunderstandings,  apologize  for  unintended
insults, and bring together the developer’s idea for the project with the
needs and priorities of the developees” (Hartman-Mahmud 2003: 526)
32 Idrisa has been involved in this field of development for several years, working for the
Nigerien  Muslim  population  while  crafting  strategies  and  messages  for  public
sensitization  and  mobilization  campaigns.  A  case  known  as  the  Polio  Controversy
illustrates the importance of the interventions to which Idrisa and his organization are
committed.  This  controversy  refers  to  Muslim  leaders’  calls  in  2003  to  boycott
immunization campaigns amid allegations that the vaccines contained anti-fertility drugs
and were part of a plot against Muslims. The allegations spread rapidly as ulama claimed
that  promoters  of  the  population  reduction  policy  were  using  the  polio  eradication
campaign to achieve their goal.  This made sense to many Muslims in Niger who had
previously resisted family planning initiatives, particularly in the 1990s (Alidou, 2005;
Sounaye; 2005).
33 The actual controversy broke out in northern Nigeria (Gwarzo 2011; Yahya 2006) in a
context of shari’a implementation and competition among Muslim elites. It then spilled
over into villages and towns in Niger with the help of preachers who adopted it as a
religious mission to fight the immunization campaign. Some ulama, using sermons and
any public exposure they could find, in particular audiovisual media, called on Muslims to
decline  offers  of  immunization.  In  Maradi,  the  most  affected  region  in  Niger,  the
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significance of the issue led to UNICEF and state campaigns countering the boycott. The
communication strategy that UN agencies and the state designed consisted of finding
allies among the ulama and local customary authorities. Pro-immunization preaching and
gatherings were organized across the region while UNICEF and the Ministry of Health
requested more involvement from local and religious authorities. In February 2003, the
campaign went  as  far  as  requesting the intervention of  President  Tandja  and senior
government officials in an effort to quell the impact of anti-immunization messages. In
the  small  town of  Dan Isa  near  the  Nigerian border,  Nigerien officials  supported by
UNICEF, the Polio Eradication Initiative and the World Health Organization launched the
Dan Isa Initiative that  actively promoted the polio immunization campaign,  with the
involvement of ulama. 
34 The anti-boycott  campaign was relatively successful since immunization boycott calls
have all but disappeared. But the issue is still a cause for concern, especially because polio
cases, which had been decreasing in the 1990s, are now on the rise again, although only
by a few cases a year. One of my informants at the PEV (Programme Élargi de Vaccination21)
blames this resurgence on the 2003 immunization boycott,  the effect of which is still
visible in the last three years’ polio cases. Recent statistics, for example, show that polio
cases in Niger went from 11 in 2007 to 12 in 2008. In 2009, 15 cases were identified, though
initial plans had forecasted the eradication of the disease by 2005.22 
35 Referring to the polio vaccine controversy, Idrisa argues that Islamic tradition not only
authorizes taking measures to prevent the spread of an epidemic but that there are many
instances  in  the  hadiths where  Muhammad recommended such practices.  He  asserts:
“Allah says: ‘only senility and death have no cure’. God makes the disease, but also its
cure.  No  disease  exists  without  a  cure.  So,  Muslims  should  know this  [verse  of  the
Qur’an].” From Idrisa’s perspective, knowing similar verses is the first step to acquiring
the  science  and  the  knowledge  Muslims  should  cultivate  in  their  fight  against  the
obscurantism of many ulama. The ulama Idrisa is referring to are those who saw a plot to
“eliminate  Muslims”  in  the  polio  vaccine:  to  counter  them,  nothing  could  be  more
efficient than educating the masses. In his mediating role, Idrisa’s contribution seems to
be appreciated by many of his NGO collaborators and he has found a meaningful field for
development strategists. “Communication is crucial, and we need to focus on it”, he has
repeatedly argued. He is aware that as long as there are development initiatives affecting
the  way  Muslims  view  themselves,  there  will  be  a  need  for  the  kind  of  work  his
organization does. 
36 A series of pamphlets he was planning to hand out to trainees summarizes the approach.
In those we examined together, Idrisa has listed several Qur’anic and/or hadith references
for each idea he planned to discuss. This was a way for him to convince the ulama to
embark on the pro-immunization and pro-family planning campaigns. Because of their
influential social positions, winning over these leaders would represent a crucial step in
popularizing the ideas that the campaigns present. As he told me, “we [his organization
and himself] have been able to convince ulama who were initially reluctant to accept our
ideas.”23 
37 In  targeting  ulama,  this  approach  seeks  primarily  to  broaden  support  and  build  a
favorable ulama base. It is assumed that the support ulama lend to social development
initiatives will eventually trickle down and dissipate resistance and opposition. This has
been part of the strategy that UN agencies and the Niger government have adopted to
counter negative reactions that have doomed development initiatives, especially at the
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local  level  where  the  power  of  the  ulama to  shape  perceptions  and  alter  collective
behavior could not be rivaled. In this context, winning the ulama over may be difficult but
it is usually worth the effort, not only because of their role as the depository of sacred
power, but also because of their position in the configuration of local politics.
38 Drawing conclusions from the polio controversy in Nigeria,  Yahya (2006)  argues that
dispelling public anxieties about international agencies contributes a great deal to the
success of their projects. In Niger, the decision state officials and international agencies
have made to focus on a counter-boycott campaign has represented an invitation for
organizations such as Fauziya that focus on communication and mediation to take public
roles. As Idrisa noted, “development is about changing behavior and giving people the
information they need to make their decisions. [Therefore,] a well-informed decision is
better than a blind following of the alem [Muslim cleric].” The notion of communication
Idrisa uses here could be understood more broadly as communication in any development
sector that needs the assistance of learned Muslim leaders. Idrisa’s narrative consists of
portraying the ulama who opposed the immunization campaigns as ignorant and lacking
the sound knowledge to speak for Islam.
39 Within  the  public  sphere  in  Niger,  many  Muslims  who  share  Idrisa’s  view  have
demarcated themselves from the ordinary ulama, who usually have limited competency in
Arabic. As a graduate of the Islamic University of Say, Niger, Idrisa endeavors to fight
what  he  sees  as  misrepresentations  of  both  “development  actions”  and  the  Islamic
tradition. He builds on the social capital Arabic literacy provides in contemporary Niger,
where only a select few know Arabic, the language of the scriptures. On the one hand, he
claims to serve Muslims by presenting the message of Islam to his fellow countrymen and,
on the other hand, he is assisting international organizations in delivering their message.
Idrisa’s pro-development perspective and opposition to ‘counter-development actions’
obviously makes him less critical of the agencies and state institutions with which he
collaborates. His role, as he sees it, does not include critical engagement of the message.
Rather, as a broker, he plays the role of translator as he draws on the Islamic conceptual
framework to secure the support of fellow Muslims.
40 A critical appraisal of this position may show that, from Idrisa’s perspective, development
is better understood as a process in which people try to find the most efficient strategy to
change their attitudes and social behavior. Thus, Idrisa’s role is not only about formatting
campaign messages and readying them for a local consumption and cultural fitness. He is
pro-development, as he argues, not because he believes all initiatives are beneficial to
people but because he is preoccupied with the potential for change and its justification
through  an  Islamic  framework.  In  this  regard,  Fauziya  has  produced  many  reports,
pamphlets  and  other  communication  strategy  documents  in  order  to  prove  Islam’s
acceptance of practices such as family planning, girls’ education, immunization, etc. After
we examined a ‘message’ he had designed for a seminar meant to raise ulama awareness
of the risks of early and under-age marriages, he remarked: “Most Muslims who oppose
these initiatives don’t actually know the position of the Islamic tradition on these issues;
and  from  the  justifications  I  hear,  obviously,  they  don’t  know  where  to  find  these
positions; they just don’t have the knowledge.”24 This sets up the stage for a long tirade
against the ulama he associates with obscurantist leaders eager to take advantage of the
people’s lack of Islamic learning. As he added later, “the ulama may well be revered in the
society, but most of them have a limited knowledge of the Islamic tradition.”
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41 To support his claims that vaccination is not foreign to Islam, he points to a hadith that
relates Khalif Umar’s trip to Sham during which, after part of the delegation entered a
city, word came that an epidemic had broken out. When the Prophet was informed, he
immediately  sent  recommendations  for  “preventive  measures  similar  to  the  polio
immunization  we  are  doing  today.”  According  to  Idrisa,  if  Muslims  know of  similar
episodes, they would think twice before they turn down the immunization offers. This
may  sound  very  simplistic  as  it  stresses  only  one  dimension  in  the  issue  regarding
Muslims’ opposition to development policies, but it draws on a trend of Sunna discourses
that are seeking to re-Islamize Nigerien society. Following in the footsteps of the Prophet
(to paraphrase Ramadan’s  formula [2007]),  has  been one of  the patterns of  Muslims’
public behavior in the last few years (Alidou & Alidou 2008; Souley 2005; Sounaye 2009).
This perception of Islam and how Muslim practices ought to be has inspired numerous
organizations and various discourses in Niger. To dissipate resistance, Fauziya also had to
justify  the  ideas  it  communicates  and the attitudes it  recommends.  That  is  why the
reference to the prophetic tradition has become a major trait of Idrisa’s public discourse.
42 As one may see, agents like Idrisa navigate between two worlds and portray themselves as
developers whose function is twofold. On the one hand, they are educating people to open
up  to  dialogue  and  communication,  a  prerequisite  for  the  fruition  of  development
initiatives.  On the other hand,  they provide international  agencies  and culturally ill-
defined initiatives with religious justification and a framework acceptable to Muslims. As
an intermediary between two parties, they act both as culture translators who seek to
dispel misrepresentations, and social engineers who are designing messages that lessen
suspicion  and  reinforce  relations  between  parties.  At  this  intersection  of  roles  and
registers, Idrisa capitalizes on his skills as a product of the medersa (a school model that
combines French and Arabic). His knowledge of the Qur’an combined with his linguistic
skills (he also speaks Hausa and Zarma, the two main national languages of Niger) make
him part of an elite that development agencies dearly need in Niger.
43 Fully  aware  of  the  social  and  political  influence  they  may  have  in  this  position,
organizations like Idrisa’s are acting for “the well being of our brothers and sisters” and
for “development to happen,” as they say. In this context, Idrisa wants to cast himself as a
new type of Muslim leader who, from a pro-development position, will affect Muslims’
representations and behavior. Because of the previous controversies surrounding social
development programs related to family planning and population-growth policies, it has
become clear that to alter values and behavior, UNICEF and similar organizations need
cultural  understanding  but,  most  importantly,  they  need  brokers  like  Idrisa  and  his
organization who can provide a grounding in Islamic tradition, an approach that seems
more convincing than any material provision.
 
Ways of Doing Development: Is There An Islamic Way?
44 As AMA finds ways of implementing and passing on an understanding of development
that  follows  Islamic  precepts,  for  example,  the  0%  interest  rate  they  practice  and
promote, Idrisa is attempting an Islamization of development initiatives as he seeks to
translate the messages agencies and organizations hope to deliver into Islamic idioms.
These are only two perspectives that contribute to a redefinition and a reinterpretation
of development. They illustrate the ongoing desire of Muslims to mark their presence in
an arena where they have often been absent. While AMA is intervening in this arena as a
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funding agency, Idrisa, as a mediator and broker, is building the development bridge. In
this instance, they represent a transformation that sees Islamic faith-based organization
and Muslim activists now taking leading roles in humanitarian and development actions.
45 In effect, the proliferation of Islamic faith-based organizations has followed a global trend
that has seen the emergence of Islamic transnational NGOs launching welfare programs
(Singer 2008).  Alleviating poverty and suffering across the world (Singer 2008;  Clarke
2007; Ferris 2005; Benthall, Jerome & Bellion-Jourdan 2003; Weiss 2002) have often been
listed among their goals. This development pattern is perceptible in Niger, not only with
AMA  but  also  with  transnational  Islamic  organizations  such  as  the  Ahmadiyya
organization, Islamic Relief and Qatar Aid. In the last five years, the country has faced two
major  famines  (in  2005 and 2010)  that  prompted massive  international  assistance to
which Islamic faith-based organizations contributed significantly despite their limited
resources compared to the ‘traditional’ development agencies and organizations. Their
approach consisted  essentially  of  providing  grain,  services  (healthcare)  and  facilities
(wells,  mosques,  dispensaries and orphanages)  in suburban and rural  areas.  Niamey’s
suburbs  and  Tillaberi  rural  areas  are  two  illustrations  of  areas  that  received  such
interventions. 
46 Besides the chronic vulnerability of the country, as evidenced by the 2005 and 2010 food
crises, recent democratization processes and neoliberal development philosophies have
shaped how AMA and Idrisa – the foci of my discussion here – represent themselves as
segments of civil society. It is interesting to see how the neoliberal understanding of civil
society has also influenced their initiatives.  However, the fact that neoliberal policies
resulted in the erosion of the state’s role – especially in social sectors – and the opening
up of development to civil society (McDuie-Ra & Rees 2010; Weiss 2002) is not enough to
explain the current proliferation of Islamic NGOs. The evidence suggests two concomitant
processes. 
47 The first consists of the global assertiveness of Muslims, as Eickelman & Piscatori (2004)
show, particularly in domains where they seek participation and where they have been
either absent or quiet. How Muslims see themselves participating and being represented
within various socio-political spheres, including the development sector, seems to be the
critical mark of this process. In Niger the claims of more than 20% of domestic Islamic
organizations can be read as an indicator of such a trend. Various reasons lie behind this
development, from the desire to provide Muslims with a voice to the mere strategy of
capturing Zakat funds, which has led in recent years to fierce competition among Islamic
organizations. Beyond Niger and across Africa, a similar trend is also perceptible (Kaag
2008; Weiss 2007, 2000; Renders 2002).
48 The second process involves the emergence of an Islam-based development discourse.
While the practices and discourses in the process I describe above may be secular, the
second process is generally tied to religiosity. The most critical element in this process is
the tradition and the values and norms it conveys. Theologically guided, the effort can be
viewed as an attempt to put religious obligations and recommendations into practice. For
example, Zakat and Sadaqah25 are concepts that pervade AMA’s vocabulary but also the
operational frameworks of faith-based organizations such as Islamic Relief (Abuarqub &
Philips 2009). Through philanthropist appropriations of Islam, these organizations are
seeking to popularize new perceptions and implement practices of development based on
Islamic norms. Organizations such as Islamic Relief, Qatar Aid and AMA share the goal of
an alternative  development.  This  recalls  the  post-modern and post-colonial  move  to
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critique the concept and the model of development applied to the Third World (Matthews
2004;Escobar 1984). The alternative presented by many development initiatives in Niger –
and certainly across the world, as the literature shows – relies on redefining development
action and seeking to fight poverty through a religious framework. In the Islamic context,
Zakat, Sadaqah and forms of waqf26are viewed as the resources that would contribute to
social justice.
49 Obviously, this understanding of doing development is not new terrain for Muslim actors
(Weiss 1998) but in countries such as Niger, the explicit connection between Islam and
development is only now being articulated. Not only are interventions conceived as being
part of a religious approach to fighting poverty, they are also being reinterpreted and
redefined as  ways  of  following Islamic  principles.  One key illustration I  came across
relates to the Ahmadiyya inauguration of a well rehabilitation project in 2009. To give
meaning to the project,  the representative of  the organization leading the ceremony
drew from the prophetic tradition in the following terms: “While moving from Mecca to
Medina, our prophet Muhammad (P.U.H) [Peace be Upon Him] showed us the significance
of providing water for our fellow brothers and sisters, when he purchased a well from a
Jew.”27 
50 An Islamic motivation, as Renders (2002), Sadouni (2009b) and Otayek & Soares (2009)
observed, informs Islamic NGOs’ actions. The previous quote confirms this view. Doing
development in an Islamic way in this instance may not necessarily carry overt claims of
proselytism.  Compassion,  for  example,  suffices  to  give  an Islamic  connotation to  the
action. The global Islamic organization Islamic Relief is one illustration of such a mode of
operation. The organization launched operations in Niger during the 2005 food shortage
and since then has developed various programs including grain distribution, healthcare
clinics, orphanages, well digging and water sanitation. One of the most public activities of
this organization is the food distribution that occurs during the Muslim festivals at the
end of the Ramadan (Eid al fitr) and Tabaski (Eid al adha). Obviously, the choice of these
specific rituals reinforces the symbolic nature of the initiatives and adds a clear Islamic
tone to the assistance.
51 As the genealogy of Islamic NGOs’ intervention in Africa has highlighted (Otayek & Soares
2009; Sadouni 2009; Kaag 2009; Clarke 2006), Christian NGOs have emulated many Islam-
inspired initiatives. However, Islamic faith-based organizations do not want to be viewed
as  exclusively  devoted  to  Muslims,  even  though  participation  in  some  of  their
programmes requires “being a good Muslim.” Ben Ali  has persistently pointed to the
international norms AMA follows, and observed that “we are more professional” in order
to counter  a  negative  perception of  the agency.  The efforts  to  be more professional
include strict  managerial  practices that  balance expenditure and focus on immediate
impact. One can perhaps read the signs of this claim of professionalism in the frugality of
AMA’s offices. On the day of my first interview at the AMA Niger headquarters in Wadata,
while waiting for my informant to arrive, I was struck by how clean, frugal and quiet the
office was. There were no chairs in the waiting area but only two solid benches where a
dozen persons could sit. To my left, in the corner was a coffee table, which contrasted
with the aesthetics in most NGOs offices in Niamey. And to my right was a water fountain
that  several  employees  and  visitors  used  while  I  was  still  waiting.  Unlike  most
international NGOs, AMA has no air conditioning but only a ceiling fan, and on the walls
there was only a picture of  the Kaaba and two information boards.  Similar austerity
characterizes the Basora vocational training centre.
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52 While  one  could  concede  that  there  is  no  Islamic  development  as  such,  as  my
interlocutors have suggested, from the perspectives of the actors and agencies I have
observed, one of the main guiding principles includes following Islamic norms. In some
instances, being Muslim can even be a prerequisite, as I found out on my second visit to
the AMA headquarters in Niamey. On this occasion, on the information board hanging
across the waiting room, one could read several  calls  for  scholarships for which the
requirement was to be a “good Muslim”, which confirmed the findings that initiatives can
also be devoted to “capturing souls” (Weiss 2002).
53 In showing how Muslims organize, manage, support and implement activities,  Islamic
NGOs such as AMA are better positioned to emulate and inspire other Muslims.  This
emulation could be the turning point in Muslim efforts to alleviate the hardship of the
needy and the poor  in a  country where over  60% of  the population lives  below the
poverty line. For example, the 0% interest rate that regulates lending policy is said to be
the  materialization  of  an  Islamic  moral  order  that  rejects  capitalist  practices.
Humanitarianism then also becomes part of the Muslim faith and life. Ali,28 the director of
an Islamic agency I met in Maradi in July 2008, stresses this point and argues that such
recommendations  are  already  defined  in  the  Islamic  tradition  as  alms  giving  and
solidarity are key values in Muslim social life. He insists that, mu’amala29 ensures that you
care about and are sensitive to the hardships of your neighbors and therefore share the
products of your good fortune with them. He recalls a powerful image in the local popular
saying that goes “you should never leave your neighbors with only the good smell of the
dish you cooked,30 you owe them a share”.
 
Concluding Remarks
54 The 1990s in Niger were a period when faith mattered and the restructuring of both the
public  and the  Islamic  spheres  led  to  a  liberalization of  Islamic  initiatives.  This  has
affected not only how Muslim organizations view themselves as public actors but also
how  they  operate  in  a  socio-political  context  that  has  established  the  state’s  non-
interventionism as a principle of good governance. In fact at the end of the 1990s, Muslim
voices concerned about social policies persistently demanded that Islam be taken into
consideration in governance (Sounaye 2005). Some of these actors, as they join forces
with international agencies and transnational organizations are making access to water,
healthcare, food security and humanitarian assistance priorities in their actions.
55 As illustrated by the actors I have presented in this contribution, doing development in
an Islamic manner can be understood and practiced differently. But, for both Idrisa and
AMA,  contextual  constraints  seem  to  be  major  factors  that  shape  their  views  and
initiatives. Seeking more development results on the ground, actors like Ben Ali and AMA
are pushing for more managerial skills, accountability and responsible ownership. For
their part, Idrisa and Fauzya are seeking behavioral change while they ground their pro-
development discourse in Islamic scriptural tradition. The Qur’an and the Hadiths are
then used in counter-boycott discourses to ease reception and then behavioral change.
The idea of Fauzya as an Islamic organization is therefore one that supports, justifies and
promotes a modern social project. That he is fighting for the well-being of Muslims in
Niger is the salient trait of Idrisa’s claims. “We campaign for development based on the
Islamic tradition” is how I heard him summarize the work of his organization. “We are
establishing a lasting relationship,” Ben Ali concluded. 
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56 These series of claims may be suspected and problematized, but what development means
does not seem very problematic for either of these ‘developers’. Their serene demeanor is
helping them live their lives as pragmatists who have work to do but less a philosophy to
devise,  even though, as they have both suggested,  there is no such thing as “Islamic
development”. Yet they are contributing by doing development based on Islamic values
from two different perspectives. Perhaps therein lies the meaning of being a good Muslim
for them.
57 Being a good Muslim in the development sector may, however, not be restricted to its
humanitarian  meaning.  In  effect,  most  people  involved  in  non-governmental
development initiatives would agree with the suggestion that more managerial skills are
needed in community-based initiatives.  This  constraint  of  development applies  to all
developers,  whether  they  collaborate  with  local  communities,  state  institutions  or
individuals and regardless of their religious motivation. Both Ben Ali and Idrisa indicate
that the problem with development projects is that they fail ethically before they actually
fail.  Since  ethics  sustain  action,  Ben  Ali  suggests that  a  better  relationship  with
communities, a community-centered approach to ownership and self-sufficiency could
help avoid failed development projects. What remains to be seen however is how these
philosophies  are  helping  development  to  occur  on the  ground,  as  the  author  of  my
opening quotes expects it.
58 From this elaboration,  it  appears that Islamic faith-based organizations like AMA are
operating in a context where they are trying to reconcile the urgencies of two different
frameworks: the international and managerial one based on pure rational operations, and
the ethical, normative and religious framework it finds in Islam. As for Idrisa, he is not
only  being  a  broker;  he  is  also  involved  in  a  legitimating  combat  that  opposes  two
categories of Muslim leaders: those who represent the establishment and are criticized
for their lack of mastery of the Qur’an; and those who, like himself, claim to be the light
that would dissipate the obscurantism of the others. By operating as they do, AMA and
Idrisa illustrate two modes of intervention that alter the perceptions of both Islam and
development by inviting Islamic principles to shape their perspectives and give meaning
to their initiatives.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 
References
ABUARQUB, M. & PHILLIPS, I., 2009. A Brief History of Humanitarianism in the Muslim World, London,
Islamic Relief Worldwide.
ALIDOU, O. & ALIDOU, H., 2008. ‘Women, Religion, and the Discourses of Legal Ideology in
Republic of Niger’. AfricaToday, no. 3, 54, pp. 23-36.
Doing Development the Islamic Way in Contemporary Niger
Bulletin de l'APAD, 33 | 2011
16
BENTHALL, J., & BELLION-JOURDAN, J., 2003. The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim
World, London, I.B. Tauris.
BUSH, R., 2007. Poverty and Neoliberalism: Persistence and Reproduction in the Global South, London &
Ann Arbor, Pluto Press.
CASANOVA, J., 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
CLARKE, G., 2007. ‘Agents of Transformation?: Donors, Faith-based Organisations and
International Development’, Third World Quarterly, no. 28 (1), pp 77-96.
CLARKE, G., 2006. ‘Faith Matters: Faith-based Organizations, Civil Society and International
Development’ Journal of International Development, no. 18, pp. 835-848.
CROMBÉ, X., & JÉZÉQUEL, J-H., (eds), 2009. A Not-So Natural Disaster: Niger 2005, New York,
Columbia University Press.
EICKELMAN, D.F.,&PISCATORI, J., 2004. Muslim Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
ESCOBAR, A., 1984. ‘Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of
his Work to the Third World’, Alternatives, no. 10 (3), pp. 377-400.
FERRIS, E., 2005, ‘Faith-based and Secular Humanitarian Organizations’, International Review of the
Red Cross, no. 858 (87).
GWARZO, T. H., 2011. ‘Islamic Religious Leaders and Family Planning in Northern Nigeria: A Case
Study of Zamfara, Sokoto and Niger States’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, no 31 (1), pp.143-151.
HARTMAN-MAHMUD, L., 2003. ‘A Language of Their Own: Development Discourse in Niger’, Signs:
Journal of Women in Culture and Society, no. 2 (29), pp. 518-27.
IDRISSA, A.,2005. ‘Modèle islamique et modèle occidental : le conflit des élites au Niger’, in
Gomez-Perez, M.,L’islam politique au sud du Sahara : identités, discours et enjeux, Paris, Karthala,
2005, pp. 347-372.
KAAG, M., 2009. ‘Aide, Oumma et Politique: Les ONG islamiques transnationales’, in Otayek, R. et
Soares,B. Islam, État et Société, Paris, Karthala, 2009, pp. 132-159.
KAAG, M., 2008. ‘Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad: Islamic Solidarity in the Age of
Neoliberalism’, Africa Today, no. 3(54), pp. 3-18.
MCDUIE-RA, D., & REES, J.A., 2010. ‘Religious Actors, Civil Society, and the Development Agenda:
the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion’,Journal of International Development, no. 22 (1), pp. 20-36.
MATTHEWS, S., 2004. ‘Post-Development Theory and the Question of Alternatives: A View from
Africa, Third World Quarterly, no. 25 (2), pp. 373-84.
MONGBO, R. L., 2007. ‘Des courtiers ruraux pour le développement au Bénin. Rapport d’une
recherche conduite au Bénin dans le cadre du projet «courtiers locaux du développement’,Le
bulletin de l’APAD, no. 11..
MOULAYE, H., 2007. ‘Dynamique des Associations islamiques au Niger’ Actes du Colloque : l’État
Moderne et l’Islam. Niamey, Buco , pp. 189-210.
OTAYEK, R. & SOARES, B., 2009. Islam, État et Société, Paris, Karthala, pp. 7-44.
RAPLEY, J., 1996. Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World, Boulder, Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
RENDERS, M., 2002. ‘An Ambigous Adventure: Muslim Organizations and the Discourse of
‘Development’ in Senegal’, Journal of Religion in Africa, no. 32 (1), pp. 61-82.
Doing Development the Islamic Way in Contemporary Niger
Bulletin de l'APAD, 33 | 2011
17
ROSENAU, J. N., & CZEMPIEL, E.-O., 1992. Governance without Government: Order and Change in World
Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
SADOUNI, S., 2009a. ‘Nouveaux acteurs religieux en Afrique du Sud : l’exemple de l’humanitaire
islamique’ in Otayek, R. et Soares, B., Islam, État et Societe, Paris, Karthala, 2009, pp. 161-183.
SADOUNI, S., 2009b. ‘Humanisme spirituel et ONG islamiques en Afrique du Sud’, Afrique
Contemporaine, no. 231, pp. 155-170.
SINGER, A., 2008. Charity in Islamic Societies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
SOUNAYE, A. 2009. ‘Islam, État et société : à la recherche d’une éthique publique au Niger’ in 
Otayek, R. et Soares, B., Islam, État et Societe, Paris, Karthala, 2009, pp. 327-351.
SOUNAYE, A. 2005. ‘Les politiques de l’islam dans l’ère de la démocratisation de 1991 à 2002’, in 
Gomez-Perez, M., L’islam politique au sud du Sahara: Identités, discours et enjeux, Paris, Karthala,
2005, pp. 503-525.
WEISS, H., 2007. ‘The Expansion of Muslim NGOs in Ghana’, ISIM Review, no. 20, pp.12-13.
WEISS, H., 2002. ‘Reorganising Social Welfare among Muslims - Islamic Voluntarism and Other
Forms of Communal Support in Northern Ghana’, Journal of Religion in Africa, no.32 (1), pp. 83-109.
WEISS, H., 2000. ‘Zakat in Northern Ghana: Not an Institution but a Goal to be Achieved’ 
Hemispheres, no. 15, pp. 141-157.
WEISS, H., 1998. ‘A Tentative Note on Islamic Welfare: Zakât in Theory and Praxis in the Sokoto
Caliphate’, Hemispheres, no. 13, pp. 63-77.
YAHAYA, M, 2005. ‘Polio Vaccines — Difficult to Swallow. The Story of a Controversy in Northern
Nigeria’. Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, no. 261.
NOTES
1.  Dnyanada,  Ben Ali,  Idrisa,  Habu and Isa are nicknames I  have given to my informants to
ensure their privacy. 
2.  I would like to acknowledge the Social Science Research Council and the Program of African
Studies at Northwestern University that granted me funds in the summer of 2008 to collect part
of the empirical data I used for this article.
3.  Muslim clerics.
4.  I would like to thank the Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherche sur les Dynamiques Sociales et le
Développement  Local,  Niamey,  Niger  that  provided  me  with  affiliation  and  the resources  that
proved  helpful  in  writing  this  article.  Thanks  also  go  to  my  Fall  2009  Development  Studies
students on the Boston University Niger Program. Their questions and curiosity inspired the
thoughts I present here. I also want to thank Sue Fono Nya who commented on an earlier draft of
this article.
5.  Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme (2009).
6.  Cheick Ismael, interview, August 2004 and Alpha Khalid, interview, July 2008. See also Sounaye
(2009). 
7. Zakat (Arabic): alms giving, obligatory charity. This is one of the five pillars of Islam.
8.  Ben Ali, AMA Programme Manager, interview, 15 March 2010.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
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12.  Isa, AMA Programme Assistant, interview, 22 February 2010
13.  Ben Ali, AMA Programme Manager, interview, 15 March 2010.
14. Ibid.
15.  Habu, AMA Programme Assistant, interview, 17 January 2010.
16.  The notion of ‘ordinary Muslims’ refers to Muslims who are commoners and not engaged in
activism.
17.  Ministère de l’Intérieur et de la décentralisation, liste des Associations Islamiques au Niger.
18.  Among the most visible, one could count the Association pour les Œuvres Islamiques et Sociales,
the Association pour la Promotion de l’Enseignement de la Langue Arabe et de l’Education Islamique, the 
Association  Jamiyat  Nassirat  Dine,  the  Réseau  Islamique  de  la  Lutte  Contre  les  IST/VIH/SIDA,  the 
Association Islamique des Jeunes pour la Coordination et le Renforcement des Activités de Développement,
the Alwafa, Ligue pour l’Unité et la Solidarité Arabo-Africaine, the Association des Femmes Musulmanes
pour les Œuvres de Bienfaisance et de Développement, and the Groupement des Associations Islamiques en
Matière  de  Planification  Familiale  et  de  la  Promotion  de  la  Femme  en  Islam,  a  group  of  Islamic
associations  and  ulama that  have  helped  UN  agencies  popularize  concepts  such  as  family
planning related to social development.
19. Fauziya: from Arabic, meaning victorious or successful, one who wins. By choosing this name,
Idrisa and his colleagues wanted to stress the positive contribution their organization would
have on “opening people’s eyes” (wayewan kay, in Hausa).
20.  Idrisa, Fauziya leader and workshop trainer, interview, 25 February 2010.
21.  Expanded Program on Immunization.
22.  Source: Programme Élargi de Vaccination, Internal Report, 2010.
23.  Idrisa, Fauziya worksho trainer, interview, 25 February 2010.
24. Ibid.
25. Alms giving. Unlike Zakat, Sadaqah is not obligatory.
26.  Endowment.
27. My translation of the following: “Notre prophète Mohamed (S A W) nous a montré à quel
point il est important de donner de l’eau à nos frères et sœurs en payant un puits auprès d’un juif
lorsqu’il a quitté la Mecque pour Médine.” Sahel Dimanche, 1365, 20 November 2009, p. 4.
28.  Ali, AMA executive in Maradi, interview, 29 June 2008.
29. Social interaction, civility.
30. Dag’guia, in Hausa.
ABSTRACTS
The rare literature on Islam in Niger that has addressed the contribution of Islamic organizations
to the broad domain of  development,  has most often focused on the controversies  involving
these organizations, their elite entrepreneurs on one side, and state officials on the other side.
Criticism  and  rejection  have  not  been  the  only  attitudes  toward  state-sponsored  initiatives.
Participation has also been a pattern of these interactions. Whether with family planning or HIV/
AIDs projects, ulama have contributed if not to run these initiatives, at least to raise awareness
among communities across the country. In addition to local organizations, many international
Islamic agencies have initiated several well-digging programs, charity programs and assistance
to undertrained young Nigeriens. This has given “Islamic development” a materiality since the
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emergence of an Islamic sphere seeking to provide Islam with a normative role in all domains of
public life. For a long time development has remained the preserve of the state, in particular
because of the theoretical assumption that state mediates development. With the emergence of a
civil  society  in  the  1990s,  this  statist  consideration  gave  way  to  the  philosophies  of  “local
development” stressing the local appropriation of development initiatives. With the idea of doing
Aid  and  assistance  the  Islamic  way,  a  universe  of  discourse  has  opened  up  enriching  the
problematic  of  development by emphasizing the faith factor.  This  contribution looks at  how
Islamic  development  actors  intend  to  promote  and  mediate  development  by  focusing  on
communication, managerial skills and ethics. 
La rare littérature sur l’Islam au Niger qui porte sur les organisations islamiques participant aux
processus de développement se focalise le plus souvent sur les conflits qu’elles entretiennent
avec l’État. Or, les relations entre pouvoirs publics et organisations islamiques sont aussi fondées
sur des collaborations. Ainsi s’agissant de la planification familiale ou des projets de lutte contre
le VIH-Sida, des ulamas contribuent à ces initiatives en sensibilisant les populations partout dans
le  pays.  En  outre,  elles  initient  des  programmes  de  charité.  Ce  « développement  islamique »
révèle combien la sphère islamique s’investit dans différents domaines de la vie publique alors
que pendant longtemps les politiques de développement sont restées un domaine réservé de
l’État.  Avec  l’émergence  d’une  société  civile  dans  les  années  1990,  cette  considération  est
remplacée par des idéologies du développement fondées sur l’appropriation locale. L’idée de faire
de l’assistance et  de l’aide selon une « voie  islamique »  ouvre à  tout  un registre  de discours
mettant  l’accent  sur  le  facteur  de  la  foi.  La  présente  contribution  traite  des  manières  par
lesquelles  les  acteurs  islamiques  du  développement  promeuvent  des  formes  singulières  de
communication, de compétences de gestion, et d’éthique. 
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